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ABSTRACT 
 
Research summary: Extant research suggests that firms rationally evaluate external and/or 
internal contingencies when deciding how to reconfigure their alliance portfolios. We advance a 
behavioral perspective which assumes that managers are boundedly rational and thus rely on 
behavioral heuristics when making alliance portfolio reconfiguration decisions. In panel data on 
U.S.-listed biotechnology firms, we find that below-aspiration performance motivates a firm to 
form alliances with novel partners within the resource scope of its existing alliance portfolio. 
This effect is weakened by equity ties with existing partners and strengthened by firm-specific 
uncertainty. Conversely, above-aspiration performance leads to new alliances with existing 
partners but outside the resource scope of the firm’s existing alliance portfolio. Finally, as 
organizational slack increases, a firm forms alliances with novel partners focusing on new-to-the-
portfolio resources. 
 
Managerial summary: We study why and how firms change the configuration of their alliance 
portfolios over time. We find that actual performance relative to performance objectives, and 
firms’ excess resources, are important drivers of such change. The more firms fail to meet their 
performance objectives, the more likely they are to form alliances with novel partners focusing 
on areas in which they already have one or more alliances with other partners. The more firms 
exceed their performance objectives, the greater their inclination to form alliances with their 
existing partners in areas in which they do not yet have alliances. The greater the stock of excess 
resources, the greater firms’ propensities to form alliances with novel partners focusing on areas 
in which they do not yet have alliances. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The portfolio perspective on interfirm alliances suggests that the benefits firms derive from their 
alliance portfolios can exceed the sum of the benefits obtained from each individual alliance 
(Hoehn-Weiss, Karim, & Lee, 2017; Wassmer, 2010). Building on this insight, numerous studies 
have sought to identify alliance portfolio configurations that enhance firm performance (e.g., 
Bos, Faems, & Noseleit, 2017; Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010; Lavie, 
2007; Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012; Wassmer, Li, & Madhok, 2017), 
and related outcomes such as liquidity events (Hoehn-Weiss & Karim, 2014), knowledge 
acquisition (Frankort, Hagedoorn, & Letterie, 2012), and product innovation (Wuyts & Dutta, 
2014). While these studies contribute to understanding the consequences of portfolio 
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configurations, little research has examined why firms decide to change the configuration of, or 
“reconfigure”, their alliance portfolios over time, and how they implement such decisions. 
Besides conceptual suggestions (e.g., Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Koka, Madhavan, & 
Prescott, 2006), empirical studies show that alliance portfolio reconfiguration may be driven by 
firm-specific uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004), gradual shifts in a firm’s 
strategy in response to external technological changes (Lavie & Singh, 2012), combinations of 
strategic uncertainty and firm competencies (Hoffmann, 2007), and external contingencies such 
as technological discontinuities (Asgari, Singh, & Mitchell, 2017) or market competition and 
uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Ozcan, 2018). While providing valuable insights into the 
antecedents of alliance portfolio reconfigurations, these studies conceptualize managers as value-
maximizing decision makers who make portfolio reconfiguration decisions based on a rational 
evaluation of external and/or internal contingencies. Yet, managers are more accurately viewed 
as boundedly rational (Simon, 1955) and so they may rely on behavioral heuristics when making 
decisions regarding alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Despite broader evidence that behavioral 
drivers such as performance feedback and a stock of slack resources (Cyert & March, 1963) 
influence firms’ collaborative activities (Baum et al., 2005; Ener & Hoang, 2016; Lungeanu, 
Stern, & Zajac, 2016; Makarevich, 2018; Tyler & Caner, 2016), we know little about how such 
factors may affect firms’ alliance portfolio reconfigurations. 
In this study, we develop a comprehensive model of alliance portfolio reconfiguration based 
on the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), a theory of decision making rooted 
in the notion that managers are boundedly rational. Our central line of argument consists of four 
parts: (1) Performance feedback and slack resources influence firms’ preferences regarding value 
creation and appropriation from their alliance portfolios (Lavie, 2007); (2) portfolio-level value 
creation and appropriation derive from synergies and conflicts in the alliance portfolio (Hoehn-
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Weiss et al., 2017); (3) these synergies and conflicts are determined by portfolios’ partner and 
resource characteristics (Gulati, Lavie, & Madhavan, 2011); and thus (4) firms accommodate 
their evolving value creation and appropriation preferences by reconfiguring their portfolios 
through simultaneous partner-choice and resource-focus decisions in newly formed alliances. 
We propose that below-aspiration performance will motivate a firm to seek greater value 
appropriation from its alliance portfolio to address performance problems (Cyert & March, 
1963). To this end, the firm will reconfigure its portfolio by forming alliances with novel 
partners, yet focusing on resources already accessible through its alliance portfolio, which may 
induce competition between new and existing partners, increasing the firm’s bargaining power 
(Lavie, 2007). In contrast, above-aspiration performance and slack resources motivate a firm to 
seek greater value creation from its alliance portfolio (Chen & Miller, 2007). Therefore, the firm 
will reconfigure the portfolio by forming alliances focusing on new resources, thus expanding the 
scope for synergistic resource combinations (Gulati et al., 2011; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). 
While above-aspiration performance motivates firms to form such alliances with existing partners 
due to the implied satisfaction with these partners (Levinthal & March, 1993), slack motivates 
and enables simultaneous experimentation with new resources and novel partners (Greve, 2003a). 
We also uncover some boundary conditions by examining how firms’ equity ties to existing 
partners and firm-specific uncertainty alter the role of performance feedback and slack resources 
in motivating specific types of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Empirical analyses of U.S.-
listed biotechnology firms from 1981 to 2000 generally support our predictions. 
Our first and primary contribution lies in developing and testing a behavioral theory of 
alliance portfolio reconfiguration. By conceptualizing managers as boundedly rational decision 
makers, we show evidence that they are guided by behavioral heuristics, thus providing novel 
insights into the antecedents of observed alliance portfolio configurations. Second, while the 
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behavioral theory has long argued that firms may respond differently to below-aspiration 
performance, above-aspiration performance, or organizational slack, empirical evidence of such 
differences is sparse (Posen et al., 2018). By uncovering how the nature of firms’ responses to 
these distinct behavioral drivers differs, we extend the behavioral literature with more fine-
grained and discerning evidence of behaviorally motivated organizational decisions. Finally, 
behavioral research has traditionally focused on the relationships between behavioral drivers and 
organizational decisions, with limited attention to the boundary conditions of such relationships 
(Greve & Gaba, 2017; Shinkle, 2012). In the context of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, we 
extend this nascent understanding of boundary conditions by elucidating how a firm’s equity ties 
and firm-specific uncertainty interact with behavioral mechanisms. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The core premise of the portfolio perspective on alliances is that, in addition to value obtained 
from individual alliances, firms can also derive value from their alliance portfolios by combining 
resources accessed through multiple simultaneous alliances (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Lavie, 
2007; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). A critical determinant of such additional value is the 
prevalence of portfolio interdependencies, that is, the synergies and conflicts in the portfolio 
which result from “the complex patterns of resource exchanges or flows between a focal firm and 
one alliance partner as well as the resource flows between a focal firm and other partners within 
its alliance portfolio” (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017: 57). Portfolio interdependencies determine a 
focal firm’s value creation and appropriation from its alliance portfolio (Lavie, 2007). 
Specifically, a firm may create value by exploiting synergies arising from combinations of 
portfolio resources, meaning alliance partners’ tangible and intangible assets and capabilities, 
such as specialized equipment, expertise in a specific area, or technological know-how, whose 
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services are made available to the firm through collaboration (Gulati et al., 2011).1 Moreover, the 
firm can appropriate value from its alliance portfolio by exploiting conflicts among its partners 
(Lavie, 2007). 
As a firm’s preferences change regarding value creation and appropriation from its alliance 
portfolio, a motivation will arise to alter portfolio interdependencies in a way that accommodates 
these evolving preferences. A firm can accomplish this by reconfiguring portfolio characteristics 
that give rise to potential portfolio interdependencies. We begin by discussing such 
characteristics. Subsequently, we identify three distinct portfolio-reconfiguration options that can 
change portfolio interdependencies, with different implications for value creation and 
appropriation from a firm’s portfolio. Finally, we develop predictions regarding how performance 
feedback and a stock of slack resources influence a firm’s alliance portfolio-reconfiguration 
decisions, by affecting its preferences regarding value creation and appropriation. 
Alliance portfolio characteristics and interdependencies  
Alliance portfolio research suggests three determinants of synergies and conflicts in an alliance 
portfolio. First, the resource richness of an alliance portfolio—the breadth of portfolio resources 
available to a firm through its alliances—determines the scope for portfolio synergies (Gulati et 
al., 2011). As the breadth of portfolio resources increases, so does the scope for their synergistic 
combinations, implying greater value creation potential available to the firm (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 
2017; Lavie, 2007; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). Second, a firm’s receptivity to portfolio 
resources—how effectively a firm can leverage these resources (Gulati et al., 2011)—determines 
the extent to which the firm can realize potential synergies in the portfolio. A key determinant of 
receptivity is the quality of a firm’s ties to its alliance partners (Gulati et al., 2011), which in turn 
depends on relational assets, such as shared collaborative routines (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002) 
                                                            
    1 “Portfolio resources” correspond to what Gulati et al. (2011) call “network resources.” 
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and trust (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009). Although relational assets are dyadic in nature (Gulati et 
al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002), they can also enhance portfolio-level value creation because more 
effective access to partner resources in individual alliances enhances a firm’s ability to combine 
such resources with other portfolio resources. 
Third, the availability to a firm of alternative partners providing access to similar resources 
determines the degree of potential conflicts within a portfolio and, thus, the firm’s relative 
bargaining power vis-à-vis its partners (Lavie 2007), that is, its ability to favorably shape the 
terms of resource exchanges with its partners (Yan & Gray, 1994). A firm’s bargaining power is 
limited to the extent that it depends on specific partners to access a given resource. Multiple 
alliance partners enabling access to similar resources may induce conflicts in an alliance portfolio 
in the form of competition among a firm’s partners. Such competition enables the firm to 
negotiate more favorable resource exchange conditions with its partners, enhancing its ability to 
appropriate value created through the portfolio (Lavie, 2007). 
This line of reasoning suggests that the richness of portfolio resources, the receptivity of a 
firm to these resources, and the availability of alternative partners jointly can affect portfolio 
synergies and conflicts. Therefore, reconfiguring these portfolio characteristics is likely to change 
such interdependencies, which may in turn change the extent to which the firm can create and 
appropriate value from its alliance portfolio. Below, we identify and discuss the benefits, costs, 
and risks of particular portfolio-reconfiguration options in light of their potential impact on 
portfolio synergies and conflicts. 
Alliance portfolio reconfiguration 
In this study, alliance portfolio reconfiguration refers to the addition of one or more alliances that 
introduce novel partners and/or new resources to a firm’s alliance portfolio in a way that changes 
the portfolio’s resource richness, the firm’s receptivity, and/or the availability of alternative 
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partners. A portfolio’s resource richness increases when the firm adds to its portfolio an alliance 
focusing on new resources—that is, resources not currently accessible through the portfolio—
which extends the scope for synergistic combinations of portfolio resources (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 
2017; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). A firm’s receptivity depends on the extent to which the firm 
shares relational assets with its partners. Since such assets are developed over the course of 
repeated collaborations (Gulati, 1995; Zollo et al., 2002), alliances with novel partners—with 
which the focal firm does not currently have an alliance—may reduce the firm’s effectiveness in 
combining portfolio resources. However, novel partners may also introduce the firm to 
innovative ways of combining portfolio resources (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005), which may 
enhance value creation from its alliance portfolio. 
The availability of alternative partners increases when a firm adds to its portfolio an alliance 
with a novel partner focusing on resources already accessible through the portfolio (Lavie, 2007). 
The presence of multiple alliances in a portfolio that provide access to similar resources induces 
competition between new and existing partners for preferential access to the firm’s resources and 
attention, increasing the firm’s bargaining power and enabling it to appropriate a greater share of 
the value created in the portfolio (Lavie, 2007; Sailer, 1978). However, such an act may also lead 
to unfavorable outcomes for the focal firm. Specifically, existing partners may perceive the firm’s 
new alliances as cannibalizing the value of their alliances with the firm (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 
2017), for example due to possible leakage of their proprietary knowledge to the firm’s novel 
partners. Such perceptions may prompt existing partners to take defensive actions and sever their 
resource exchanges with the focal firm. 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
We propose that a firm can reconfigure its alliance portfolio in three ways. Table 1 
summarizes our typology of alliance portfolio-reconfiguration options based on partner-choice 
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and resource-focus decisions in a firm’s new alliances. First, the firm may form alliances with 
novel partners focusing on existing resources, that is, resources already accessible through its 
alliance portfolio. Such alliances may enhance the firm’s value appropriation from the portfolio 
and introduce the firm to innovative ways of combining portfolio resources (Lavie, 2007). At the 
same time, they can reduce the firm’s receptivity due to the lack of relational assets shared with 
novel partners. Furthermore, this reconfiguration option may trigger defensive actions from 
existing partners, which will lower the firm’s ability to create value from the portfolio (Hoehn-
Weiss et al., 2017). Thus, the firm will invoke this portfolio-reconfiguration option to the extent 
that it anticipates the potential increase in value appropriation to outweigh such costs and risks. 
Second, the firm may form alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources. 
Leaving the firm’s value appropriation ability unchanged, this reconfiguration option enables the 
firm to extend the resource richness of its alliance portfolio, which increases the portfolio’s value 
creation potential (Gulati et al., 2011; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). This option also allows the 
firm to exploit the relational assets shared with existing partners, which enhances its receptivity. 
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, this reconfiguration option may preclude the firm from 
adopting innovative ways of combining portfolio resources that may be accessible through novel 
partners, preventing it from realizing the full value creation potential of its portfolio resources. 
Thus, a firm will be inclined to invoke this portfolio-reconfiguration option to the extent that it is 
satisfied with the share of the value that it appropriates from its alliance portfolio, and with the 
outcomes of resource exchanges with its partners. 
Third, the firm may form alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. This 
reconfiguration option enables the firm to simultaneously extend its portfolio’s resource richness 
and experiment with innovative ways of combining resources accessed through novel partners. 
However, the lack of relational assets shared with novel partners may reduce the effectiveness of 
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such experimentation and curb value creation from the portfolio. Moreover, although these 
alliances pose no direct competition to resource exchanges between the firm and its existing 
partners, the latter may still engage in defensive actions because the inclusion of novel partners in 
an alliance portfolio is likely to restrict the resources and attention extended by a firm to its 
existing partners (Singh & Mitchell, 1996). Thus, a firm will be motivated to invoke this 
portfolio-reconfiguration option to the extent that it can tolerate a reduction in collaboration 
effectiveness as well as the risk of severed resource exchanges with its existing partners. 
To illustrate these three portfolio-reconfiguration options, we provide for each type of 
alliance formation an example from the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, our empirical 
context. The process of developing genetically engineered drugs, which involves identifying 
potential drug candidates, developing them to have the desired properties, and undertaking 
clinical trials, requires combinations of resources that even the largest firms do not possess in-
house. Therefore, alliance portfolios have been a vital means for firms in this industry to access 
resources (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Pisano, 2006). Table 2 provides illustrative 
examples of alliance formations by Genentech, the first public biotechnology firm, which 
pioneered the industry by developing the first genetically engineered human therapeutic. 
--- Insert Table 2 about here --- 
As Genentech’s alliances illustrate, firms can also add to their portfolios alliances with 
existing partners focusing on existing resources, in addition to the three reconfiguration options 
that we discussed. Such alliances enable a firm to deepen its focus on resource combinations 
already available in its alliance portfolio. For example, firms may continue the development of 
promising projects or apply the same resources towards developing products with different 
commercial purposes. However, since such alliances do not introduce novel partners and/or new 
resources to a firm’s alliance portfolio, in our study they do not imply a portfolio reconfiguration. 
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Overall, in addition to the costs of forming and managing alliances that are associated with 
alliance portfolio reconfiguration in general (Asgari et al., 2017), each of these reconfiguration 
options implies a unique combination of potential benefits, costs, and risks. Firms reconfigure 
their alliance portfolios to the extent they anticipate that the benefits of reconfiguration outweigh 
the costs and risks (Wassmer, 2010). Although available research provides valuable insights into 
the antecedents of alliance portfolio reconfigurations, it has tended to conceptualize managers as 
value-maximizing decision-makers who rationally evaluate external and/or internal contingencies 
when making portfolio reconfiguration decisions. Yet, managers are more accurately viewed as 
boundedly rational (Simon, 1955), which implies they may rely on behavioral heuristics when 
making decisions regarding alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Thus, we next draw on the 
behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) and develop and test predictions regarding 
how boundedly rational managers make alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions based on an 
evaluation of the benefits, costs, and risks of different reconfiguration options. 
HYPOTHESES 
A key premise of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) is that the extent and 
nature of organizational search and risk-taking is influenced by a firm’s actual performance 
relative to performance aspirations (Greve, 2003b), and its stock of slack resources (Greve, 
2003a; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Performance aspirations serve as reference points that help 
distinguish perceived failures and successes, and typically evolve over time as functions of a 
firm’s own historical performance and the performance of comparable others (Bromiley & 
Harris, 2014; Levinthal & March, 1981). An attainment discrepancy occurs when performance 
deviates from aspirations, and may serve as an inducement for organizational search and risk-
taking. 
Negative attainment discrepancies trigger “problemistic search”, a goal-oriented behavior 
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focused on raising performance to the firm’s aspiration level (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & 
March, 1981). A firm’s stock of slack resources, that is, resources in excess of those necessary 
for the firm’s daily operations, prompts “slack search”, which enables the firm to undertake more 
substantial organizational changes and experiment with risky but potentially rewarding projects 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 2003a; Levinthal & March, 1981). Finally, positive attainment 
discrepancies, while not necessarily generating slack resources, may motivate experimentation 
with new projects by reducing the cost of accessing new resources, thus mitigating fears of poor 
performance and motivating firms to loosen managerial controls (Baum et al., 2005). Based on 
these insights, we develop predictions connecting performance relative to aspirations and slack 
resources to the three alliance portfolio-reconfiguration options that we identified above. 
Below-aspiration performance 
When performance is below aspirations, firms engage in problemistic search, which typically 
implies a search for relatively immediate improvements to reduce or eliminate negative 
attainment discrepancies (Levinthal & March, 1981). Thus, problemistic search tends to be 
myopic, in that it constitutes efforts to find solutions near the problem symptom or the current 
activities (Cyert & March, 1963). Because alliance portfolios are important for firm performance 
(Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Lavie, 2007; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012), firms performing below 
their aspirations will initiate actions to obtain greater benefits from their portfolios to address 
performance shortfalls. Due to its relatively short-term and myopic nature, problemistic search is 
unlikely to involve exploration of new resource combinations because such exploration typically 
requires considerable time before contributing to a firm’s performance (March, 1991). Thus, 
speedier performance improvements are more likely realized through an increased commitment 
to existing resources. We therefore propose that a negative attainment discrepancy motivates 
firms to search for ways to appropriate more value from existing portfolio resources. 
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Firms can more effectively leverage and appropriate value from existing portfolio resources 
by forming alliances with novel partners, yet replicating the resource focus of existing alliances. 
Such alliances may offer fresh perspectives on how to use existing portfolio resources more 
effectively. Moreover, a firm’s potential access to innovative ways of utilizing its existing 
portfolio resources through novel partners is likely to induce competition between the firm’s 
existing and novel partners, enabling the firm to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis these 
partners, and appropriate a greater share of the value created through the portfolio (Lavie, 2007). 
Although this portfolio-reconfiguration option carries the risk of defensive actions from existing 
partners, a negative attainment discrepancy will motivate firms to tolerate such risks in an effort 
to meet performance aspirations (Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Greve, 2003a, 2003b). 
Hypothesis 1. The lower a firm’s performance relative to aspirations, the greater the 
firm’s number of new alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources. 
 
Above-aspiration performance 
Firm performance exceeding aspirations leads to loosening managerial controls and motivates 
experimentation with new projects with high potential pay-offs (Baum et al., 2005; Chen & 
Miller, 2007). Moreover, above-aspiration performance reduces the cost of accessing new 
resources (Baum et al., 2005), for example by enhancing the attractiveness of a firm to investors. 
Consequently, firms performing above aspirations will be inclined to explore new value creation 
opportunities. A viable way in which a firm can achieve this is to extend the scope for synergistic 
combinations of resources accessed through its alliance portfolio by enhancing the portfolio’s 
resource richness. While such exploration is inherently uncertain and risky (March, 1991), above-
aspiration performance motivates firms to tolerate these uncertainties and risks by acting as a 
buffer between actual performance and aspirations (Baum et al., 2005).  
For two reasons, we suggest that firms performing above their aspirations will be motivated 
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to include new resources in their alliance portfolios through alliances with existing rather than 
novel partners. First, allying with existing partners enables firms to exploit relational assets 
shared with these partners, which in turn enhances the effectiveness of combining portfolio 
resources accessed through new and existing alliances. Second, above-aspiration performance 
acts as an implicit validation of the firm’s choice of alliance partners, and induces satisfaction 
with the value appropriated from the alliance portfolio (Levinthal & March, 1993). Although 
allying with novel partners may enable a firm to appropriate greater value from its alliance 
portfolio, or to adopt new ways of combining portfolio resources, for firms performing above 
aspirations the risk of jeopardizing their relationships with existing partners likely outweighs the 
potential benefits offered by novel partners (Singh & Mitchell, 1996).  
Hypothesis 2. The higher a firm’s performance relative to aspirations, the greater 
the firm’s number of new alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources. 
 
Organizational slack 
Our arguments so far imply that when reconfiguring their alliance portfolios in response to 
performance feedback, firms limit their risk-taking to either the partner-choice or resource-focus 
decisions. Thus, they avoid excessive risks associated with the formation of alliances with novel 
partners focusing on new resources (Lavie, Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011). Yet, when do firms opt 
for this third reconfiguration option? 
The behavioral theory of the firm offers organizational slack as one source enabling firms to 
experiment with risky but potentially rewarding organizational changes (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Greve, 2003a). Absorbed slack, a particular form of organizational slack, refers to organizational 
capacity above and beyond what is required for a firm’s day-to-day operations, such as excess 
facilities and personnel for research and development (R&D) (Greve, 2003a). The deployment of 
absorbed slack does not directly affect a firm’s core operations and so enables relatively more 
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risky explorations of new value creation opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1981; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996). While above-aspiration performance also allows firms to experiment with risky 
projects (e.g., Baum et al., 2005), positive attainment discrepancies are potentially short-lived 
due to the adaptive nature of performance aspirations. Instead, absorbed slack accumulates and is 
dispersed over longer periods of time, providing a more permanent buffer between the outcomes 
of risky actions and their consequences for short-term performance (Greve, 2003a). 
We argue that absorbed slack motivates and enables firms to reconfigure their alliance 
portfolios by forming alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. This may 
introduce a firm to superior ways to combine the new resources with existing portfolio resources. 
Yet, such alliances may restrict the firm’s value creation from the portfolio if existing partners 
sever their resource exchanges with the firm due to the perceived shift of the firm’s managerial 
resources and attention to its novel partners (Singh & Mitchell, 1996). Moreover, alliances with 
novel partners reduce the firm’s receptivity, leading to less effective value creation at the 
portfolio level. Absorbed slack mitigates the impact of a decline in value creation from the 
alliance portfolio by acting as a buffer between the outcomes of organizational actions and their 
short-term performance consequences. Thus, slack mitigates a firm’s vulnerability to defensive 
actions from its partners as well as reduced receptivity, and provides firms the motivation and 
ability to experiment with novel partners and new resources. 
Hypothesis 3. The higher a firm’s level of absorbed slack, the greater the firm’s 
number of new alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. 
 
The moderating role of equity ties to existing partners  
When examining firms’ alliance portfolio reconfigurations, one important contingency is a firm’s 
equity ties to its existing alliance partners. Equity ties include joint ventures in which partners 
share equity in a newly created entity, and minority equity investments in which one or both 
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partners make an investment in the other in exchange for equity (Gulati & Singh, 1998). In 
contrast to purely contractual alliances, equity ties require alliance partners to make ex-ante 
investments, which increase their commitment to each other (Gulati & Singh, 1998). First, an 
investment by a partner in a focal firm’s equity provides the partner some control over the firm’s 
activities, deterring the firm from engaging in actions that might undermine the alliance and the 
partner’s investment (Oxley, 1997). Second, an investment by a focal firm in a partner’s equity is 
unlikely to be recovered unless the alliance achieves its intended objectives. Thus, to protect its 
own investment, the firm will be committed to maintaining its resource exchanges with the 
partner towards the realization of alliance goals, and refrain from actions that might jeopardize 
these exchanges. Finally, reciprocal equity investments, including joint ventures, create a “mutual 
hostage” situation in which both partners have incentives not to jeopardize their relationship 
because doing so would put their ex-ante investments at risk (Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989). 
We argue that, by increasing commitments to their existing partners, equity ties influence 
firms’ alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions in response to performance feedback and slack 
resources. First, in H1 we predicted that below-aspiration performance motivates firms to 
reconfigure their alliance portfolios by forming alliances with novel partners focusing on existing 
resources. We expect equity ties to curb this tendency by amplifying the perceived costs and risks 
relative to the potential benefits associated with this portfolio-reconfiguration option. A firm’s 
new alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources may be perceived as a form of 
opportunistic behavior by existing partners that have invested in the firm (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 
2017), prompting them to invoke their equity rights to protect their investments in the firm. The 
risk of retaliation is lower when investing partners do not perceive such alliances as an attempt to 
behave opportunistically, or when they have a limited ability to retaliate. However, the shift of a 
firm’s attention regarding existing resources from existing to novel partners may signal 
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inconsistency with the commitment expectations implied by equity ties, and harm the firm’s 
reputation as a desirable alliance partner (Dacin, Oliver, & Roy, 2007). 
When equity ties are instead formed by a focal firm’s investments in its partners, this 
portfolio-reconfiguration option is tantamount to suggesting that such investments failed to 
generate the expected returns. Although ex-ante investments in partners’ equity are sunk costs for 
a focal firm, managers tend to avoid acknowledging losses so as not to appear incompetent 
(Staw, 1981). Thus, firms are likely to maintain a commitment to these investments (Inkpen & 
Ross, 2001), and refrain from actions implying a decline in their value. In case of reciprocal 
investments, the desire to avoid retaliation, reputation loss, and an implied loss in value of 
existing equity investments jointly deter firms from invoking this portfolio-reconfiguration 
option. 
This line of reasoning also extends to our hypothesized effect of absorbed slack on firms’ 
tendencies to reconfigure their alliances portfolios by forming alliances with novel partners 
focusing on new resources (H3). Although absorbed slack enables firms to tolerate the costs and 
risks of simultaneous exploration with novel partners and new resources, equity ties to existing 
partners likely curtail this tendency. While absorbed slack shields a firm’s regular operations 
from the short-term decline of value created from its alliance portfolio, the possible negative 
performance consequences of partner retaliation, reputation loss, and/or an implied loss in the 
value of existing equity investments amplify perceived costs and risks associated with this 
portfolio-reconfiguration option. Thus, equity ties reduce the impact of absorbed slack on alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration through alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. 
Finally, for firms performing above aspirations, we expect equity ties to reinforce the 
tendency to reconfigure alliance portfolios by forming alliances with existing partners focusing 
on new resources (H2). Above-aspiration performance motivates firms to seek greater value 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
creation from their alliance portfolios through exploration of new resource combinations, and 
implies a commitment to existing partners by acting as an implicit validation of the firm’s choice 
of alliance partners. By imposing additional commitments to existing partners, equity ties 
heighten the opportunity cost of allying with novel, rather than existing, partners to experiment 
with new resources, thus increasing the attractiveness of this portfolio-reconfiguration option in 
response to positive attainment discrepancies. 
Hypothesis 4a. As a firm’s equity commitment to existing partners increases, a 
decrease in performance relative to aspirations is less strongly associated with a 
firm’s number of new alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources. 
 
Hypothesis 4b. As a firm’s equity commitment to existing partners increases, an 
increase in performance relative to aspirations is more strongly associated with a 
firm’s number of new alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources. 
 
Hypothesis 4c. As a firm’s equity commitment to existing partners increases, an 
increase in absorbed slack is less strongly associated with a firm’s number of new 
alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. 
 
The moderating role of firm-specific uncertainty 
Another factor that influences firms’ alliance portfolio reconfiguration is the degree of firm-
specific uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Howard et al., 2016), which refers to ambiguity 
stemming from idiosyncratic sources regarding the expected outcomes of organizational actions 
(Gulati et al., 2009). In order to manage and reduce firm-specific uncertainty, firms search for 
new information, which can often be accessed through novel alliance partners (Beckman et al., 
2004). We extend these insights to develop predictions regarding how firm-specific uncertainty 
affects firms’ alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions, by intensifying problemistic search 
and attenuating slack search. 
Problemistic search compels firms performing below aspirations to seek targeted solutions to 
generate greater performance from their current activities (Greve, 2003a). Reconfiguration of 
alliance portfolios through the formation of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing 
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resources can be such a solution (H1). We argue that firm-specific uncertainty will strengthen the 
tendency to invoke this portfolio-reconfiguration option as a response to below-aspiration 
performance. Uncertainty compounds the need for new information regarding the causes that 
prevent firms’ existing portfolio resources from contributing to a satisfactory level of 
performance. Firm-specific uncertainty also implies a lowered ability to assess the likelihood that 
new and useful information will become available through particular novel alliance partners. 
Increasing the number of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources will enable 
firms to diversify their attempts to access new information to address performance problems, and 
increase the probability that such information will become available. 
In contrast to problemistic search, slack search enables firms to undertake risky but 
potentially rewarding projects that are more distant from their current activities, such as 
experimenting with new resources. Absorbed slack, and to a lesser extent above-aspiration 
performance, allows firms to afford such risk-taking by acting as a buffer between the potential 
adverse outcomes of risky decisions and firms’ core activities. While experimentation with new 
resources inherently implies uncertain pay-offs, firm-specific uncertainty compounds the 
difficulty of evaluating the expected outcomes of such experimentation. As a result, whether the 
anticipated benefits of portfolio configuration options involving a focus on new resources will 
outweigh their costs and risks becomes more ambiguous. This, in turn, may lead to concerns 
regarding the extent to which past performance exceeding aspirations and absorbed slack may 
shield firms’ regular operations from the potentially adverse effects of risky portfolio-
reconfiguration decisions. Therefore, we expect firm-specific uncertainty to deter firms from 
engaging in alliance portfolio reconfiguration through alliances focusing on new resources with 
existing or novel partners as a response to above-aspiration performance and absorbed slack. 
Hypothesis 5a. As firm-specific uncertainty increases, a decrease in performance 
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relative to aspirations is more strongly associated with a firm’s number of new 
alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources. 
 
Hypothesis 5b. As firm-specific uncertainty increases, an increase in performance 
relative to aspirations is less strongly associated with a firm’s number of new 
alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources. 
 
Hypothesis 5c. As firm-specific uncertainty increases, an increase in absorbed slack 
is less strongly associated with a firm’s number of new alliances with novel partners 
focusing on new resources. 
 
METHODS 
Empirical setting 
We tested our hypotheses in an empirical study of U.S.-listed dedicated biotechnology firms 
(DBFs) engaged in alliances during 1985–2000. Although many large pharmaceutical firms and 
some food and agricultural firms have been involved in biotechnology since its emergence in the 
1970s, the central players in this industry are DBFs (Pisano, 2006; Powell, 1996). DBFs are ideal 
subjects for our study. To share the costs and reduce the risks of drug development, DBFs 
actively engage in alliances with each other and with other players, such as large pharmaceutical 
firms (Pisano, 2006). Such alliances play an important role in the innovation performance of 
DBFs (Baum et al., 2000) and evidence implies that DBFs care deeply about the value creation 
and appropriation potential of their alliance portfolios (e.g., Asgari et al., 2017). Moreover, a 
focus on DBFs gives us a relatively homogeneous set of firms, which ensures comparability in 
the firms’ line of business and normal resource requirements, an important condition for isolating 
performance feedback and slack resource effects (Greve, 2003a, 2003b). 
Data and sample 
Following Gulati and Higgins (2003) and Higgins and Gulati (2006), we obtained our initial 
sample of 280 public DBFs from the BioWorld Stock Report for Public Biotechnology 
Companies in 2001. This listing excludes large corporations with primary activities outside of 
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biotechnology, thus constituting an appropriate data source for our study. In this initial sample, 
we were able to match 231 firms to identifiers in both Compustat and the NBER Patent Data 
Project (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2002). We then identified all alliances formed by these 231 
firms from 1985 to 2000 using the Recombinant Capital (ReCap) database, which is commonly 
used for alliance research in the biotechnology industry (Schilling, 2009). Of the 231 firms, 196 
had one or multiple alliances during the sampling window. 
We collected additional data to measure independent and control variables from the NBER 
Patent Data Project, Compustat, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) US Stock 
Databases, the Pharmaprojects® data set of Informa Pharma Intelligence, Mergent Online, 
Mergent Archives, and firms’ 10-K filings and initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses. We 
applied listwise deletion in case of missing data and retained all firms with at least two years of 
available data, reducing the sample from 196 to 165 DBFs, which resulted in a final panel data 
set of 1,016 firm–year observations involving the formation of 1,340 alliances. This data set 
formed the basis for our empirical models predicting alliance portfolio reconfiguration in the 
years 1985–2000. The panel is unbalanced, reflecting a substantial increase in the number of 
alliances formed in pharmaceutical biotechnology during the sampling period (Frankort & 
Hagedoorn, 2019). To address left-censoring, we used information on alliance formation by the 
sampled firms during 1981–1984, from which we constructed initial alliance portfolios. 
Subsequently, we constructed the variables related to firms’ alliance portfolios based on a rolling 
four-year window. Our dependent variables take a one-year lead in our analyses, meaning that 
alliances formed from year t–3 to year t (i.e., the firm’s “existing alliance portfolio”) affected 
alliance formations in year t+1. This is consistent with the common assumption of a five-year 
horizon of alliances in biotechnology (Robinson & Stuart, 2007). 
Dependent variables 
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Consistent with our conceptualization of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, we used three 
dependent variables according to the nature of the partners and resources involved in a firm’s 
newly formed alliances in a given year. We obtained information on partner identities and 
resources exchanged for each alliance from ReCap. For each newly formed alliance, we 
established whether the alliance partner was “novel”, in the sense that the firm had no active 
alliance(s) with that partner in its existing alliance portfolio (Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). Similarly, we established whether a resource provided by a newly formed 
alliance was “new” to a firm’s alliance portfolio, in that it was not already provided by an 
alliance in the firm’s existing portfolio. Following Asgari et al. (2017: 1069), we identified and 
distinguished resources using ReCap’s classification of alliances as pertaining to one or multiple 
of 53 possible technological areas.2 
We used this information to specify three distinct counts of alliances as our dependent 
variables. First, Novel partners – Existing resources is the count of alliances formed by a firm in 
year t+1 involving a novel partner and exclusively focusing on resources already accessible 
through the firm’s existing alliance portfolio. This is the dependent variable to test Hypotheses 1, 
4a, and 5a. Second, Existing partners – New resources is the count of alliances formed by a firm 
in year t+1 involving at least one new resource, with a partner already in the firm’s existing 
alliance portfolio. This was the dependent variable to test Hypotheses 2, 4b, and 5b. Third, Novel 
partners – New resources is the count of alliances formed by a firm in year t+1 involving a novel 
partner and at least one new resource. This was the dependent variable to test Hypotheses 3, 4c, 
                                                            
    2 We classified each alliance as focused on new or existing resources from a focal firm’s point of view. Typically, 
such resources include alliance partners’ proprietary data or expertise in a specified technological area. Unlike 
Asgari et al. (2017), who record separate alliances for each resource exchanged in a given collaboration, for each 
firm we recorded each alliance only once, regardless of the number of resources exchanged. Instead, we considered 
an alliance to focus on new resources when the alliance included at least one technological area that was not included 
in any alliance in the firm’s alliance portfolio. Similarly, we considered an alliance to focus on existing resources 
when the alliance did not include at least one technological area that was not included in any alliance in the firm’s 
portfolio. 
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and 5c. 
Independent variables and moderators 
Performance relative to aspirations. We constructed our variables for performance relative to 
aspirations based on the difference between a firm’s performance in year t and its historical and 
social performance aspiration levels, respectively. In many prior studies, performance has been 
based on accounting or financial measures. Yet, during the emergence of the industry, 
“biotechnologies” were typically far removed from the product market and audiences focused 
their attention on evidence of promising technologies (Pisano, 2006). Thus, consistent with recent 
studies assessing performance feedback in technology-intensive industries (Gaba & 
Bhattacharya, 2012; Lungeanu et al., 2016; Tyler & Caner, 2016), we focused on innovation 
performance to construct our performance variables. 
We relied on the patenting activities of the DBFs in our sample to calculate their innovation 
performance, and to construct historical and social aspiration levels. Patents have the potential to 
protect competitive advantage in biotechnology because they offer effective intellectual property 
protection necessary for firms to bring new technologies to market (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 
2000). Some observers even note that “the biotechnology industry would not have emerged but 
for the existence of predictable patents” (Federal Trade Commission, 2003: 17). Moreover, prior 
studies show that biotechnology firms with more patents attract more financing and go to IPO 
faster (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), while they also achieve higher 
market valuations once they are publicly traded (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). Consistent 
with these observations, numerous studies examining biotechnology have based measures of 
innovation performance on counts of patents (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009), and patents are used to construct measures of 
performance relative to aspirations in recent studies analyzing technology-intensive settings like 
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ours (Gaba & Bhattacharya, 2012; Lungeanu et al., 2016). 
We measured innovation performance as a firm’s number of successful patent applications in 
year t. Subsequently, we calculated measures of Performance – aspirations by subtracting 
historical and social aspiration levels, respectively, from the firm’s actual innovation performance 
in a given year. Following prior research (Greve, 2003b; Levinthal & March, 1981), we 
calculated historical aspiration levels as exponentially weighted moving averages of historical 
performance, as follows: Ait = ±Ait-1 + (1 – ±)Pit-1, where i is a subscript for firms; t is a time 
subscript; P is the number of successful patent applications in a given year; and the updating 
parameter ± is the weight attached to the most recent historical aspiration level Ait-1. Following 
Greve (2003b: 129), we defined ± as the value that provides the best fit of the models to the data 
(e.g., Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Gaba & Bhattacharya, 2012; Lungeanu et al., 2016). In our case, 
models predicting Novel partners – Existing resources retained an ± of 0.1, while all other 
models retained an ± of 0.9. 
We obtained social aspiration levels based on the average patenting performance of other 
DBFs in the panel in a given year (Lungeanu et al., 2016). Specifically, we calculated a firm’s 
social aspiration level as Sit = � j` iPjt/(Nt–1), where Pjt is the number of successful patent 
applications by a DBF j other than focal firm i in year t, and Nt–1 is the number of DBFs other 
than i in year t (Greve, 2003b). We used patent applications because DBFs have a reasonable 
sense of the average rate at which patents are filed. Indeed, while not immediately made public 
by the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), information on pending patents is 
typically reported in the annual reports of DBFs and likely moves extensively through networks 
of scientists, advisors, investors, and analysts (Powell, 1996). Our measure of social aspirations 
restricts social comparison to other DBFs because industry peers orient themselves towards the 
same (investor) audience and so constitute a key reference group. 
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To summarize, Performance – aspirations = Pit – Ait for historical aspirations, while it equals 
Pit – Sit for social aspirations. We used spline specifications that are more flexible in allowing 
Performance – aspirations to have different slopes above and below the aspiration level (Greve, 
2003b: 125). Specifically, Performance – aspirations (<0) equals Performance – aspirations 
when performance is below the aspiration level and equals 0 when performance is at or above the 
aspiration level. Similarly, Performance – aspirations (>0) equals Performance – aspirations 
when performance is above the aspiration level and equals 0 when performance is at or below the 
aspiration level. These variables help test Hypotheses 1, 2, 4a–b, and 5a–b. 
Absorbed slack. To test Hypothesis 3, we calculated Absorbed slack as the ratio of a firm’s 
selling, general, and administrative expenses to its sales in year t, consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Greve, 2003a). To test Hypotheses 4c and 5c, we interacted this variable with variables 
capturing equity ties and firm-specific uncertainty, as defined next. We obtained similar results 
when operationalizing this variable as the ratio of a firm’s selling, general, and administrative 
expenses to its number of employees in a given year. 
Equity ties. We constructed our first moderator, %Equity alliances, as the share of all alliances in 
a firm’s alliance portfolio in year t that include minority equity investments and/or are joint 
ventures. To test Hypotheses 4a–c, we interacted this variable with the variables for performance 
relative to aspirations and absorbed slack. 
Firm-specific uncertainty. We constructed our second moderator, Firm-specific uncertainty, as 
the standardized monthly volatility of a firm’s stock in year t, consistent with Beckman et al. 
(2004), Gulati et al. (2009), and Howard et al. (2016). Specifically, for each firm in each year, we 
obtained the coefficient of variation by calculating the standard deviation across the firm’s 
monthly stock closing prices and dividing it by their average. To test Hypotheses 5a–c, we 
interacted this variable with the variables for performance relative to aspirations and absorbed 
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slack. 
Control variables 
All models included time fixed-effects to account for broader environmental changes affecting all 
sampled firms such as fluctuations in the financing environment (e.g., Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 
2003), or technological breakthroughs such as the advances in combinatorial chemistry and high 
throughput screening in the 1990s (e.g., Asgari et al., 2017). Models predicting Novel partners – 
Existing resources and Novel partners – New resources included year fixed-effects. Models 
predicting Existing partners – New resources included fixed effects for two-year periods because 
we used conditional fixed-effects models that had less statistical power in these specific analyses. 
Nevertheless, various unconditional estimators with year fixed-effects generated similar results 
(see the “Estimation” section below). We also included a number of control variables at the firm 
level (for year t) and the alliance portfolio level (for years t–3 to t), which may affect alliance 
formation in year t+1. 
At the firm level, we controlled for two forms of financial slack which may affect a firm’s 
alliance formation (e.g., Patzelt et al., 2008). Following prior research (e.g., Greve, 2003a), we 
measured Unabsorbed slack as the ratio of a firm’s cash and short-term investments to its 
liabilities, and Potential slack as the ratio of a firm’s equity to debt. To account for potential 
changes in the nature of innovation strategies due to organizational aging and experience (e.g., 
Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000), we controlled for Age as a firm’s age in 
years since incorporation. We controlled for ROA as a firm’s return on assets to account for the 
role of financial performance in affecting the attractiveness of the firm as an alliance partner 
(Beckman et al., 2004). Headcount captures the natural logarithm of a firm’s number of 
employees, which accounted for a possible link between the size of a DBF and the scale and 
nature of its external relationships (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). We accounted for the 
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scale of a DBF’s involvement in drug discovery, which may affect a firm’s resource requirements 
(Asgari et al., 2017). Specifically, Clinical trials is the natural logarithm of the number of a 
firm’s drugs that are in clinical trials. 
We also included two variables for a DBF’s capacity to handle external knowledge (Cohen 
& Levinthal, 1990). R&D expenditures is the natural logarithm of a DBF’s R&D expenditures, 
capturing its R&D capacity. Technological scope is the extent to which the patents in a firm’s 
patent stock are distributed across distinct technology classes, which proxies for the scope of 
exploitable complementarities (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). Specifically, it captures (1 – 
∑ 𝑝𝑗
2𝑗
1 )*(Nit/(Nit–1)), where p is the proportion of a DBF’s patents in patent class j and Nit is the 
DBF’s total number of patents (Frankort, 2016). 
At the alliance portfolio level, Alliance portfolio size measures the number of alliances in a 
firm’s alliance portfolio, which may increase or decrease the probability of additional alliance 
formation (Deeds & Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). It comprises all alliances formed during the 
four-year period from t–3 to t. The variable Resources in portfolio captures the proportion of all 
53 technologies listed in the ReCap database covered in a DBF’s existing alliance portfolio. The 
more resources already covered, the less likely a firm would form alliances focusing on new 
resources. Two additional variables capture the characteristics of the alliances in a firm’s existing 
alliance portfolio, which may incentivize particular types of new alliance formation. 
Commercialization alliances is the share of a firm’s alliances that include a commercialization 
provision for the outcome of the alliance, while R&D alliances is the share of a firm’s alliances 
that explicitly designate R&D as a major activity in the alliance. 
Estimation 
Because the three dependent variables are nonnegative count variables, we estimated all models 
using a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator with conditional firm fixed-effects 
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(Wooldridge, 1999). Firm fixed-effects impose a within-firm correlation structure on the data that 
accounts for stable firm differences in alliance formation, which is important to obtain estimates 
of alliance formation in response to performance feedback and slack resources that are not 
confounded by more habitual, institutionalized drivers of alliance formation (Chen & Miller, 
2007; Greve, 2003b: 89–90). The Poisson QML estimator accommodates auto-correlated error 
terms and over-dispersion and is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity. 
A conditional fixed-effects specification discards firms without nonzero values on the 
dependent variable but generates unbiased and consistent estimates. Therefore, depending on the 
specific dependent variable, effective sample sizes vary across the models. To assess the 
consistency between conditional and unconditional fixed-effects estimations, we separately 
estimated all models on the full sample of 1,016 firm–years (165 firms) using both unconditional 
fixed-effects negative binomial regression with robust standard errors (Allison & Waterman, 
2002), and ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed-effects regression in log-linear form, with standard 
errors corrected for autocorrelation (Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). Both alternatives generated 
essentially identical results across the various hypotheses tests, including models for Existing 
partners – New resources that included year rather than two-year fixed-effects. 
RESULTS 
--- Insert Table 3 about here --- 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all the variables. 
Correlations are generally low to moderate among the explanatory variables (columns 4–22), 
although a few are somewhat higher. Some of the variables for Performance – aspirations (>0) 
are strongly correlated but none of these are used in the same model. Moreover, Alliance 
portfolio size and Resources in portfolio are correlated at r = 0.83. However, this correlation 
partly reflects differences between firms (i.e., the portfolios of firms with more alliances on 
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average cover more resources), which are absorbed by firm fixed-effects. We examined the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all explanatory variables to identify possible collinearity 
problems. The VIFs for all key variables are well below the commonly accepted threshold of 10, 
suggesting that our estimations are not materially affected by multicollinearity. 
Hypotheses tests 
--- Insert Table 4 about here --- 
Table 4 shows the models we used to test Hypotheses 1–3. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., 
Chen & Miller, 2007; Lungeanu et al., 2016), we show separate models for performance relative 
to historical and social aspirations. In Models 1 and 2, the coefficients for Performance – 
aspirations are negative, yet they are precisely estimated only above aspirations (t = -1.76 and t = 
-2.69 in Models 1 and 2, respectively). Nevertheless, the estimates for below- and above-
aspiration performance are statistically indistinguishable (Chi2[1df] = 0.05, p = 0.83 in Model 1; 
Chi2[1df] = 1.86, p = 0.17 in Model 2). Thus, the models could be re-estimated more 
parsimoniously without spline (Greve, 2003a: 694). Once this is done, the coefficient for 
Performance – aspirations is -0.0028 (t = -3.38; p = 0.001) in Model 1 and -0.0044 (t = -3.19; p = 
0.001) in Model 2. These estimates imply that, as performance decreases by one standard 
deviation relative to historical aspirations, the firm’s estimated rate of alliance formation with 
novel partners focusing on existing resources increases by 4.4% (exp[-0.0028*-15.51] = 1.044).3 
As performance decreases by one standard deviation relative to social aspirations, the firm’s 
estimated rate of alliance formation with novel partners focusing on existing resources increases 
by 8.3% (exp[-0.0043*-18.45] = 1.083). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1: The 
lower a firm’s performance relative to aspirations, the greater the number of newly formed 
alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources. 
                                                            
    3 We base these and subsequent calculations on descriptive statistics for each individual estimation sample, which 
varies across the models due to conditional estimation. 
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In Model 3, the coefficients for Performance – aspirations are positive and precisely 
determined above aspirations (t = 2.75). Nevertheless, the estimates for below- and above-
aspiration performance are statistically indistinguishable (Chi2[1df] = 0.60, p = 0.44). We thus 
re-estimated the model without spline, resulting in a coefficient for Performance – aspirations of 
0.0170 (t = 2.75; p = 0.006). Therefore, as performance increases by one standard deviation 
relative to historical aspirations, the firm’s estimated rate of alliance formation with existing 
partners focusing on new resources increases by about 50% (exp[0.0176*23.19] = 1.504). 
In Model 4, the coefficients for Performance – aspirations are positive and precisely 
determined both below and above aspirations (t = 2.44 and t = 2.95, respectively), yet here the 
two slopes appear statistically distinct (Chi2[1df] = 5.48, p = 0.02). Thus, below social 
aspirations, as performance increases by one standard deviation, the firm’s estimated rate of 
alliance formation with existing partners focusing on new resources increases by almost 160% 
(exp[0.4220*2.25] = 2.584). And above social aspirations, a one-standard deviation increase in 
performance instead increases this rate by about 68% (exp[0.0219*23.64] = 1.678). Together 
with the results in Model 3, these estimates are consistent with Hypothesis 2: The higher a firm’s 
performance relative to aspirations, the greater the number of newly formed alliances with 
existing partners focusing on new resources. 
Models 5 and 6 test Hypothesis 3, predicting that absorbed slack increases a firm’s 
propensity to form alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, the coefficient for Absorbed slack is positive and precisely determined in both 
Models 5 and 6 (t = 2.53 and t = 2.60, respectively). The point estimates are similar between the 
two models. Based on Model 5, a one-standard deviation increase in Absorbed slack increases the 
estimated rate of alliance formation with novel partners focusing on new resources by 17.4% 
(exp[0.0067*23.94] = 1.174). 
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--- Insert Table 5 about here --- 
Table 5 shows models to test Hypotheses 4a–c. Models 1 and 2 test Hypothesis 4a, by 
interacting Performance – aspirations with %Equity alliances. Although the estimates are 
indistinguishable from zero in Model 2, in Model 1 the coefficient for this interaction term is 
positive below aspirations and clearly inconsistent with a null effect (t = 3.49, p = 0.000). The 
interaction coefficient is negative and somewhat less precisely determined above aspirations (t = 
-1.76, p = 0.078). To understand these findings, Figure 1 uses the point estimates in Model 1 of 
Table 5 to show the estimated interaction effect at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of %Equity 
alliances. Below the historical aspiration level, a decrease in Performance – aspirations more 
strongly stimulates the formation of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources 
when the firm has a smaller proportion of equity ties to existing partners. Interestingly, above the 
historical aspiration level, an increase in Performance – aspirations more strongly reduces the 
formation of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources when the firm shares 
more equity ties with existing partners. Together, these findings partially support Hypothesis 4a. 
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Models 3–6 test Hypotheses 4b–c.4 In these models, all the interaction coefficients have 
relatively large standard errors and t-statistics consistently below unity, rendering all coefficients 
indistinguishable from zero at acceptable confidence levels. Thus, our data do not support 
Hypotheses 4b–c. 
--- Insert Table 6 about here --- 
Table 6 shows models to test Hypotheses 5a–c. Models 1 and 2 test Hypothesis 5a, by 
interacting Performance – aspirations with Firm-specific uncertainty. Although again the 
                                                            
    4 Due to collinearity, we could not estimate spline interactions in Model 3. Instead, we estimated one interaction 
term for continuous Performance – aspirations by %Equity alliances. We did the same in Table 6, when assessing 
the moderating effects of Firm-specific uncertainty. 
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estimates are indistinguishable from zero in the social aspiration model (Model 2), in Model 1 the 
interaction coefficient is positive below aspirations and inconsistent with a null effect (t = -2.51, 
p = 0.012). Above aspirations, the interaction coefficient is indistinguishable from zero (t = 0.74, 
p = 0.458). Figure 2 uses the point estimates in Model 1 of Table 6 to show the estimated 
interaction effect at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of Firm-specific uncertainty. Below 
historical aspirations, a decrease in performance more strongly stimulates the formation of 
alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources when firm-specific uncertainty is 
greater. These findings partially support Hypothesis 5a. 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Models 3–6 test Hypotheses 5b–c. In these models, all the interaction coefficients have large 
standard errors and t-statistics well below unity, again rendering all coefficients indistinguishable 
from zero at acceptable confidence levels. Thus, our data do not support Hypotheses 5b–c. 
Overall, the empirical evidence in Tables 5 and 6 is inconclusive with respect to whether or not 
the mechanisms underlying Hypotheses 4b–c and 5b–c are operative. In the absence of such 
evidence, we suggest that perhaps equity ties and firm-specific uncertainty represent more critical 
contingencies when a firm is engaged in problemistic search. 
To summarize, after controlling for a range of time-varying factors at the firm and alliance 
portfolio levels, and fixed effects for firms and time, we found that the nature of alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration is affected by performance relative to aspirations and organizational slack. Firms 
expand the partner base, but not the resource base, of their alliance portfolios as performance 
decreases relative to aspirations (Hypothesis 1), albeit at a reduced rate when they share equity 
ties with existing partners (Hypothesis 4a), and at an increased rate when they experience firm-
specific uncertainty (Hypothesis 5a). Firms instead expand the resource base of their alliance 
portfolios, but not the partner base, as performance increases relative to aspirations (Hypothesis 
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2). Finally, simultaneous expansion of partner and resource bases occurs as organizational slack 
increases (Hypothesis 3).5 
Robustness 
We assessed the sensitivity of our findings through several additional tests. First, our focus on 
firm-specific uncertainty as measured by stock data required that all sample firms were public, 
although our theory imposed no such requirement. We thus enlarged our sample to incorporate 
firm–year observations in which the DBFs were still private entities. This way, our estimation 
sample grew from 165 DBFs and 1,016 firm–year observations to 187 DBFs and 1,099 firm–year 
observations. While we were unable to test Hypotheses 5a–c because firm-specific uncertainty 
was only identifiable for public DBFs, we found results for Hypotheses 1–3 and 4a–c that were 
essentially identical to those shown in Tables 4 and 5.6 
Second, our results remained similar once we excluded from the estimation sample one DBF 
offering contract research services, and five DBFs headquartered outside the U.S., all in Europe.7 
These restrictions gave even greater comparability in the line of business and normal resource 
requirements of the sampled firms, enhancing the validity of the performance feedback and slack 
resource effects (Greve, 2003a, 2003b). 
Third, in models predicting Novel partners – New resources, we excluded firm–year 
observations corresponding to years in which firms formed their first alliance(s) (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006: 808). By disregarding novice collaborators, this criterion restricts Novel 
partners – New resources to only those alliances formed by firms already managing an active 
                                                            
    5 It is important to note that the heterogeneity in the effects of different behavioral drivers constitutes a 
conservative finding because all our empirical specifications allow for the possibility that below-aspiration 
performance, above-aspiration performance, and organizational slack have entirely identical consequences. 
    6 In all models, we included a fixed effect for whether an observation concerned a private firm. We found that, all 
else constant, private firms were less likely than public firms to expand either the partner or the resource base of their 
alliance portfolios. 
    7 Embrex Inc. was excluded from the sample because it offered contract research services, and the excluded 
European DBFs were Alkermes PLC (Ireland), Flamel Technologies SA and Genset SA (France), Qiagen NV 
(Netherlands), and Xenova Group PLC (UK). 
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alliance portfolio, allowing us to interpret all instances of alliance formation in the restricted 
sample as genuine acts of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Alternatively, we included in the full 
sample a dummy variable capturing whether or not a firm’s alliance portfolio had a size of zero in 
a given year. Across both approaches, we found results fully consistent with those shown in 
Models 5 and 6 in Tables 4, 5, and 6, although the coefficient for Absorbed slack was larger 
(roughly 0.011) and more precisely determined (t > 3) in the restricted sample. 
Fourth, we examined the possibility that our Performance – aspirations measures absorb a 
categorical rather than continuous classification, where performance below aspirations is 
considered a failure, and above aspirations a success, regardless of how far performance is away 
from the aspiration level (Greve, 2003b: 59-61). We checked for this possibility by incorporating 
dummy variables for whether or not performance was below aspirations (Baum et al., 2005: 551). 
The results for the direct and interactive effects of Performance – aspirations were identical. 
Thus, the sign and magnitude of performance relative to aspirations, rather than its sign alone, 
affect the nature of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. 
Finally, rather than estimating separate models for the three dependent variables, we also 
estimated least-squares simultaneous equations models, each in log-linear form, that jointly 
predict the three outcomes for all sampled firm–years. This approach explicitly treats the three 
alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions as interrelated and simultaneously determined 
(Zellner, 1962). For both performance relative to historical and social aspirations, we estimated 
one system of equations to jointly test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3; one to jointly test Hypotheses 4a–
c; and one to jointly test Hypotheses 5a–c. Across the six systems of simultaneous equations, we 
found evidence strongly consistent with that in Tables 4–6, while some of the coefficients testing 
Hypotheses 4b and 5b were more precisely determined. However, such precision must be treated 
cautiously because multiple testing (e.g., more than a dozen tests across alternative specifications 
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alone) progressively increases the probability of false positives (Romano, Shaikh, & Wolf, 2010). 
DISCUSSION 
While the consequences of alliance portfolio configurations have received considerable scholarly 
attention, less is known about how and why firms reconfigure their alliance portfolios over time. 
In this study, we complement the literature on alliance portfolio reconfiguration by developing 
and testing a comprehensive behavioral perspective. We found that as performance decreases 
relative to aspirations, firms form alliances with novel partners within the resource scope of their 
existing alliance portfolios. Such problemistic search is attenuated by equity ties with existing 
partners but intensified by firm-specific uncertainty. Conversely, as performance increases 
relative to aspirations, firms form alliances with existing partners but outside the resource scope 
of their existing alliance portfolios. Finally, firms accumulating organizational slack most 
radically reconfigure their alliance portfolios by forming alliances with novel partners focusing 
on new-to-the-portfolio resources. 
This study’s primary contribution is to research examining the antecedents of alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration. Available studies point at external contingencies, such as gradual or 
discontinuous technological changes (Asgari et al., 2017; Lavie & Singh, 2012) and market 
competition and uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Ozcan, 2018), as drivers of alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration. Internal contingencies, such as firm-specific uncertainty, competencies, and 
business strategy, have also been identified as important because they can mediate the ways in 
which external contingencies influence portfolio reconfiguration (Beckman et al., 2004; 
Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie & Singh, 2012). We contribute to this emerging body of research by 
explicitly considering how alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions may also derive from 
behavioral heuristics as a consequence of managers’ bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963). 
While firms may proactively or reactively engage in alliance portfolio reconfigurations through a 
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rational evaluation of external and/or internal contingencies, we argue and show that 
reconfiguration decisions are also shaped in predictable ways by performance feedback and 
organizational slack, thus making portfolio reconfiguration responsive to behavioral antecedents. 
One implication of this evidence is that behavioral drivers can help explain why firms may 
deviate from longer-term portfolio strategies (e.g., Hoffmann, 2007), which may lead their 
portfolios to look like apparently incoherent sets of individual alliances. Awareness of the fact 
that behavioral factors may drive portfolio reconfiguration may assist managers and investors 
when interpreting and responding to the portfolio-reconfiguration choices of their (potential) 
partners, competitors, and/or investees. Indeed, an act of alliance portfolio reconfiguration might 
require different responses depending on whether such changes are driven by fundamental shifts 
in business strategy, external contingencies, or behavioral drivers. 
Our behavioral theory extends research on alliance portfolio reconfiguration also by 
proposing that behavioral drivers lead firms to form alliances in an attempt to alter the synergies 
and conflicts arising from their portfolios’ partner and resource characteristics. Thus, it 
incorporates the multidimensionality of alliance portfolio (re)configuration (Wassmer, 2010), by 
underlining the need to simultaneously consider partner choice and resource focus in firms’ 
newly formed alliances. While of course practitioners are faced with multiple concurrent 
considerations when forming alliances to reconfigure their portfolios, available theory and 
evidence have mostly focused on individual considerations of partner choice (Beckman et al., 
2004; Howard et al., 2016) or the nature of accessed resources (Asgari et al., 2017). Our theory 
clarifies how a concurrent focus on partner-choice and resource-focus decisions is a necessary 
consequence of the value creation and appropriation preferences formed by firms with respect to 
their alliance portfolios in response to behavioral antecedents. 
By drawing attention to the importance of concurrent partner-choice and resource-focus 
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decisions, our theory also contributes to behavioral theory. Studies in the behavioral tradition 
have typically examined how performance feedback and organizational slack affect the intensity 
of search along one dimension. For example, evidence shows higher R&D intensities in firms 
performing below aspirations, but also in firms with higher levels of slack (Chen & Miller, 2007; 
Greve, 2003a). And Baum et al. (2005) find that Canadian investment banks facing attainment 
discrepancies, whether negative or positive, are more likely to accept the risk and uncertainty of 
underwriting syndicate ties with partners with which they have no existing direct or third-party 
ties. Our study departs from and extends such evidence by uncovering meaningful heterogeneity 
in the consequences of different behavioral drivers: Not only do positive and negative attainment 
discrepancies predict distinct types of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, but also slack predicts a 
reconfiguration type not predicted by performance above or below aspirations. Thus, we show 
how behavioral drivers determine not only the intensity of search in an individual dimension of 
an organizational activity, but also heterogeneity in the distribution of search across multiple 
dimensions of that same activity. 
These findings underscore the importance, for behavioral research, of more rigorously 
examining the nature of distinct search processes. Behavioral theory has long typified the nature 
of problemistic search as more short-term, myopic, and somewhat exploitative, but that of slack 
search as relatively exploratory. Yet, by focusing on the intensity of search along one dimension, 
empirical studies have not explored the possible implications of this fundamental conceptual 
distinction (an exception is Xu, Zhou, & Du, 2018), nor have they examined possible differences 
in the nature of slack search derived from positive attainment discrepancies versus organizational 
slack. Thus, it has proven difficult to disentangle the various search processes responsible for 
observed search intensities (Posen et al., 2018). By predicting and uncovering how the nature of 
search differs with its origin in below-aspiration performance, above-aspiration performance, or 
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organizational slack, our study extends the behavioral literature with more fine-grained and 
discerning evidence of behaviorally motivated organizational search. 
A final set of contributions emerge from elucidating how actor-specific contingencies 
interacted with the behavioral mechanisms shaping alliance portfolio reconfiguration. By 
uncovering how a firm’s equity ties and firm-specific uncertainty moderated the intensity of 
problemistic search in response to performance feedback, we extend a nascent understanding in 
the behavioral theory of the factors that explain heterogeneity in firms’ responsiveness to 
performance feedback (Greve & Gaba, 2017; Shinkle, 2012). First, we found that firms 
performing below aspirations are progressively more likely to form alliances with novel partners 
in existing resources, yet equity ties to existing partners reduced this tendency. Thus, consistent 
with Williamson’s (1991) intuition that cooperative and autonomous adaptation potential are 
inversely related, the possible advantages of equity-based commitments, such as incentive 
alignment with existing partners (Oxley, 1997), may come at the cost of limiting a firm’s ability 
to bring conflicting partners into its alliance portfolio. By implication, firms must consider 
whether the anticipated benefits of equity in a focal alliance outweigh the reduced ability to adapt 
the broader portfolio beyond that alliance. Second, we found that below aspirations, firm-specific 
uncertainty intensifies the formation of alliances with novel partners in existing resources. This 
finding extends evidence that firm-specific uncertainty motivates alliance formation (Beckman et 
al., 2004) because it reveals that, by intensifying firms’ responses to negative attainment 
discrepancies, such uncertainty also interacts with the process of problemistic search. 
Limitations and future research 
Opportunities exist to extend our research and address some of its limitations. First, whether or 
not particular alliance portfolio reconfiguration decisions will achieve their intended outcomes is 
inherently uncertain, and firms’ greatest control over portfolio synergies and conflicts is through 
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decisions that influence the potential for desired interdependencies. These are the decisions we 
considered. Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the eventual effectiveness of alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration decisions. Future research can complement our work by directly 
capturing portfolio synergies and conflicts, and by exploring how firms can influence such 
interdependencies towards realizing their value creation and appropriation preferences. 
 Second, firms reconfigure alliance portfolios through alliance formations and terminations 
(e.g., Asgari et al., 2017; Ozcan, 2018). We have focused on alliance formations, although we 
accounted for terminations by assuming a five-year lifespan for each alliance, consistent with 
relevant prior literature (e.g., Robinson & Stuart, 2007). Future studies might extend our 
behavioral perspective on alliance portfolio reconfiguration by focusing on alliance terminations. 
We believe such efforts are worthwhile yet challenging: They require data on alliance termination 
dates and, crucially, a sharp distinction between termination due to project or contract completion 
on the one hand, and premature termination on the other (e.g., Greve et al., 2010). 
Third, DBFs are often limited in scope, yet interesting questions emerge regarding the role of 
horizontal and vertical diversification in shaping links between behavioral drivers and alliance 
portfolio reconfiguration. We examined the role of behavioral antecedents in shaping firms’ 
alliance portfolio configurations, yet in firms with larger scale and scope such antecedents might 
simultaneously influence multiple organizational activities, including acquisitions, divestitures, 
and venture capital investments. We believe that an extension such as this is valuable yet scholars 
must take care to consider contextually important resources and performance outcomes when 
examining predictions in other empirical settings. For example, we focused our empirics on 
technological resources because these permeate all the activities of DBFs, including their 
alliances, regardless of whether they are alliances with other DBFs, public sector research 
institutions, or pharmaceutical firms (Powell et al., 1996). In settings where other resources are 
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(also) a prevalent component of firms’ external relationships, the empirical analysis must reflect 
such resources. Relatedly, we based measures of performance relative to aspirations on 
innovation performance, an outcome that DBFs’ alliance portfolios are expected to generate (e.g., 
Baum et al., 2000), and so one that should direct firms’ search efforts to their alliance portfolios. 
Tests of the implications of our theory in other settings similarly require the identification of 
contextually important performance outcomes. 
Conclusion 
Our study introduces a comprehensive behavioral perspective to research on alliance portfolio 
reconfiguration, which to date has mostly assumed value-maximizing managers while frequently 
focusing on external antecedents. Assuming that managers are boundedly rational and reliant on 
behavioral heuristics, we have focused on the internal factors of performance feedback and 
organizational slack as drivers of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, and we have offered evidence 
of some contingencies affecting the behavioral mechanisms. We hope our theory and analyses 
will stimulate further research on the evolution of portfolios of corporate development activities, 
and on the nature and contingencies of distinct behaviorally driven search processes. 
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Figure 1. Rate multiplier for Novel Partners – Existing Resources (Hypothesis 4a) 
 
 
Figure 2. Rate multiplier for Novel Partners – Existing Resources (Hypothesis 5a) 
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Table 1. Three types of alliance portfolio reconfiguration through alliance formation 
  
 Resource 
focus 
Partner 
choice 
Potential benefits Costs Risks 
1 Existing 
resources 
Novel 
partners 
Greater bargaining 
power through 
competition 
between new and 
existing partners; 
and access to 
innovative ways of 
combining portfolio 
resources. 
 
Reduced receptivity 
due to lack of 
relational assets 
shared with novel 
partners. 
Suboptimal value 
creation from 
portfolio due to 
severed resource 
exchanges with 
existing partners. 
2 New 
resources 
Existing 
partners 
Greater resource 
richness; and 
enhanced 
receptivity due to 
exploitation of 
existing relational 
assets. 
 
Inability to access 
innovative ways of 
combining new 
resources with other 
portfolio resources. 
 
Suboptimal value 
creation from 
portfolio due to 
exclusive reliance 
on existing partners 
to leverage new 
resources. 
3 New 
resources 
Novel 
partners 
Greater resource 
richness; and access 
to innovative ways 
of combining 
portfolio resources. 
 
Reduced receptivity 
due to lack of 
relational assets 
shared with novel 
partners. 
Suboptimal value 
creation from 
portfolio due to 
simultaneous 
exposure to severed 
resource exchanges 
with existing 
partners and 
reduced receptivity. 
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Table 2. Examples of Genentech’s alliances with different combinations of partner choice and 
resource focus 
 
 
 
Existing resources New resources 
Existing 
partners 
Genentech formed an alliance with 
Stemcells Inc. in 1996 to advance 
development efforts for specific drug 
candidates identified as promising 
through a previous collaboration with 
the same partner in 1994, which 
focused on a variety of candidates. In 
both alliances, the key resource 
introduced to Genentech’s alliance 
portfolio was Stemcells’ expertise in 
the oral delivery of central nervous 
system drugs. 
 
After collaborating with Incyte Inc. to 
develop and commercialize a human 
protein called BPI, Genentech formed 
an alliance with the same partner in 
1997 to access Incyte’s database on 
gene sequencing, a valuable resource to 
aid the interpretation of genetic code 
stored in DNA through gene expression 
technology. For the latter resource, 
Genentech had formed two other 
alliances with different partners by the 
time this particular alliance was 
formed. 
 
Novel 
partners 
In 1987, Genentech formed an alliance 
with Genzyme Inc. focusing on 
recombinant DNA, which enables DNA 
from different sources to be combined 
to create new DNA forms that are 
useful to treat diseases but do not exist 
naturally. Between its inception in 
1976 and this alliance, Genentech 
formed 11 other alliances with different 
partners to access technological 
expertise in recombinant DNA 
technology, a key resource to develop 
genetically engineered drugs. 
 
In 1989, Genentech formed an alliance 
with Xenova Inc. for the screening of 
biologically active small molecules to 
identify promising drug candidates for 
further development. The partners did 
not have a prior collaboration and the 
alliance introduced Xenova’s 
proprietary screening technology to 
Genentech’s alliance portfolio. This 
technology added a critical and new 
resource to the portfolio since the value 
of other drug development resources 
would increase, as new and promising 
drug candidates can more easily be 
identified using this new resource. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics and bivariate correlations 
    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Dependent variables                           
1 Novel partners - Existing resources 0.72 1.44                       
2 Existing partners - New resources 0.02 0.16 0.04                     
3 Novel partners - New resources 0.58 0.99 0.24 0.08                   
Independent variables                           
4 Performance - aspirations (<0) (Historical, ± = 0.1) -1.60 9.22 -0.28 -0.02 -0.11                 
5 Performance - aspirations (<0) (Historical, ± = 0.9) -0.06 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.16               
6 Performance - aspirations (<0) (Social) -2.66 2.64 0.13 0.06 0.14 -0.07 0.25             
7 Performance - aspirations (>0) (Historical, ± = 0.1) 2.63 9.34 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.24           
8 Performance - aspirations (>0) (Historical, ± = 0.9) 6.00 15.28 0.27 0.21 0.23 0.00 0.11 0.33 0.90         
9 Performance - aspirations (>0) (Social) 4.06 15.30 0.30 0.20 0.24 -0.10 0.07 0.28 0.86 0.98       
10 Absorbed slack 3.85 21.21 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04     
Moderating variables                           
11 %Equity alliances 0.18 0.26 0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.04 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.06 -0.05   
12 Firm-specific uncertainty 0.26 0.15 0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 
Control variables                           
13 Unabsorbed slack 5.92 8.96 -0.12 -0.03 -0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.16 -0.03 
14 Potential slack 93.18 563.51 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 
15 Age 10.07 5.49 0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.12 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.03 -0.12 
16 ROA -0.32 0.43 0.10 0.03 0.04 -0.06 0.01 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.15 -0.28 0.00 
17 Headcount (log) -2.23 1.17 0.38 0.09 0.29 -0.19 0.10 0.40 0.27 0.42 0.43 -0.13 0.08 
18 Clinical trials (log) 0.49 0.75 0.12 0.02 0.19 -0.11 0.00 0.19 0.15 0.26 0.26 0.01 0.19 
19 R&D expenditures (log) 2.32 1.35 0.36 0.09 0.32 -0.18 0.04 0.35 0.27 0.42 0.41 -0.07 0.23 
20 Technological scope 0.57 0.29 0.10 -0.01 0.14 -0.04 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.04 
21 Alliance portfolio size 4.57 5.36 0.66 0.15 0.31 -0.22 0.06 0.20 0.29 0.44 0.47 -0.08 0.04 
22 Resources in portfolio 0.06 0.06 0.56 0.16 0.35 -0.23 0.04 0.24 0.33 0.48 0.51 -0.08 0.13 
23 Commercialization alliances 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.47 
24 R&D alliances 0.52 0.39 0.21 0.08 0.13 -0.04 0.01 0.23 0.09 0.12 0.10 -0.05 0.44 
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      12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
13 Unabsorbed slack   -0.04                       
14 Potential slack   -0.03 0.04                     
15 Age   -0.01 -0.16 0.02                   
16 ROA   -0.20 0.07 0.05 0.04                 
17 Headcount (log)   -0.16 -0.28 0.04 0.12 0.41               
18 Clinical trials (log)   -0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.26             
19 R&D expenditures (log)   -0.03 -0.14 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.67 0.41           
20 Technological scope   -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.24 0.04 0.24         
21 Alliance portfolio size   0.01 -0.15 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.55 0.24 0.49 0.14       
22 Resources in portfolio   0.00 -0.17 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.58 0.28 0.57 0.19 0.83     
23 Commercialization alliances   -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.17 0.05 0.04 0.07   
24 R&D alliances   -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.16 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.31 0.01 0.28 0.33 0.34 
Notes. n = 1,016 for Means and SDs, except for variables 4, 5, 7, and 8, where n = 939. Correlations are based on n = 939 .           
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Table 4. Poisson QML conditional fixed-effects estimates: Hypotheses 1–3 
Dependent variable: 
Novel partners - Existing 
resources 
  
Existing partners - New 
resources 
  
Novel partners - New 
resources 
Aspiration level: Historical   Social   Historical   Social   Historical   Social 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Performance - aspirations (<0) -0.0026   -0.0506   2.1752   0.4220   0.0078   0.0109 
  [0.0018]   [0.0339]   [2.7968]   [0.1729]   [0.2050]   [0.0332] 
Performance - aspirations (>0) -0.0033   -0.0037   0.0170   0.0219   0.0041   0.0057 
  [0.0019]   [0.0014]   [0.0062]   [0.0074]   [0.0032]   [0.0036] 
Absorbed slack -0.0031   -0.0014   0.0635   0.0530   0.0067   0.0059 
  [0.0030]   [0.0029]   [0.0279]   [0.0245]   [0.0026]   [0.0023] 
%Equity alliances -0.3353   -0.3737   -1.0828   -1.2853   0.1063   0.2981 
  [0.4020]   [0.3579]   [1.3537]   [1.3631]   [0.4363]   [0.3929] 
Firm-specific uncertainty 0.5051   0.7448   -7.2047   -7.0726   0.2947   0.1509 
  [0.2901]   [0.3027]   [3.5041]   [3.4507]   [0.3696]   [0.3899] 
Unabsorbed slack -0.0142   -0.0233   -0.2723   -0.2560   -0.0285   -0.0200 
  [0.0124]   [0.0117]   [0.1921]   [0.1244]   [0.0146]   [0.0132] 
Potential slack -0.0001   -0.0001   0.0004   0.0002   -0.0000   -0.0000 
  [0.0001]   [0.0001]   [0.0006]   [0.0005]   [0.0001]   [0.0001] 
Age 0.7555   -0.2153   0.5901   0.8610   -0.0131   0.3686 
  [0.5787]   [0.3787]   [0.4536]   [0.4007]   [0.5206]   [0.3403] 
ROA -0.3508   -0.2552   4.7732   2.6882   -0.2823   -0.3717 
  [0.1374]   [0.1368]   [2.5712]   [1.9615]   [0.2416]   [0.2263] 
Headcount (log) 0.0748   0.1371   -1.8467   -1.9651   -0.0475   -0.0509 
  [0.1584]   [0.1528]   [1.1730]   [0.9651]   [0.2106]   [0.1896] 
Clinical trials (log) -0.0019   0.0074   -0.0650   0.4695   -0.0095   -0.0135 
  [0.1700]   [0.1643]   [1.0691]   [1.3305]   [0.1587]   [0.1473] 
R&D expenditures (log) 0.0883   0.1253   1.3421   1.3678   0.2054   0.1869 
  [0.1263]   [0.1180]   [0.7309]   [0.6608]   [0.1953]   [0.1829] 
Technological scope 0.1325   0.3538   1.1070   1.3154   0.8178   0.3139 
  [0.3663]   [0.3053]   [3.0586]   [2.9777]   [0.6709]   [0.4638] 
Alliance portfolio size -0.0226   -0.0198   0.1343   0.1603   -0.0223   -0.0279 
  [0.0111]   [0.0119]   [0.0925]   [0.0868]   [0.0310]   [0.0301] 
Resources in portfolio 4.6296   4.5785   -10.1616   -15.1671   -3.5644   -3.3604 
  [1.1175]   [1.1286]   [6.3121]   [7.5920]   [2.8783]   [2.6803] 
Commercialization alliances -0.5948   -0.6468   -3.0643   -1.1298   -0.0719   -0.1412 
  [0.4688]   [0.4336]   [2.7973]   [2.4045]   [0.5048]   [0.4731] 
R&D alliances 0.6635   0.7571   0.3521   1.5565   -0.4868   -0.4046 
  [0.3861]   [0.3346]   [1.3652]   [1.5459]   [0.3210]   [0.2909] 
n (firm-years) 675   739   162   171   778   869 
n (firms) 103   105   20   20   118   124 
Log-likelihood -547.8   -592.1   -29.81   -29.31   -552.1   -635.7 
Standard errors in brackets. All models include time fixed effects.                 
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Table 5. Poisson QML conditional fixed-effects estimates: Hypotheses 4a–c 
Dependent variable: 
Novel partners - Existing 
resources 
  
Existing partners - New 
resources 
  
Novel partners - New 
resources 
Aspiration level: Historical   Social   Historical   Social   Historical   Social 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Performance - aspirations (<0) -0.0118   -0.0451   2.1761   0.4514   0.0088   0.0108 
  [0.0031]   [0.0399]   [2.8038]   [0.2295]   [0.2046]   [0.0332] 
Performance - aspirations (>0) 0.0090   -0.0037   0.0162   0.0031   0.0041   0.0057 
  [0.0073]   [0.0040]   [0.0366]   [0.0378]   [0.0032]   [0.0036] 
Absorbed slack -0.0032   -0.0014   0.0636   0.0513   0.0066   0.0059 
  [0.0031]   [0.0029]   [0.0279]   [0.0258]   [0.0025]   [0.0022] 
Performance - aspirations (<0)* 0.0284   -0.0319       -0.1008         
     %Equity alliances [0.0081]   [0.1296]       [0.4376]         
Performance - aspirations (>0)* -0.0386   0.0000       0.0602         
     %Equity alliances [0.0219]   [0.0120]       [0.1191]         
Performance - aspirations*         0.0024             
     %Equity alliances         [0.1100]             
Absorbed slack*                 0.0058   0.0024 
     %Equity alliances                 [0.0217]   [0.0215] 
%Equity alliances -0.1660   -0.4401   -1.0950   -1.6389   0.0971   0.2947 
  [0.4281]   [0.4142]   [1.4568]   [1.7749]   [0.4420]   [0.3996] 
Firm-specific uncertainty 0.4025   0.7468   -7.2022   -7.1401   0.2956   0.1513 
  [0.3119]   [0.3042]   [3.4929]   [3.6443]   [0.3696]   [0.3901] 
Unabsorbed slack -0.0158   -0.0233   -0.2720   -0.2471   -0.0286   -0.0200 
  [0.0122]   [0.0116]   [0.1946]   [0.1251]   [0.0147]   [0.0133] 
Potential slack -0.0001   -0.0001   0.0004   0.0003   -0.0000   -0.0000 
  [0.0001]   [0.0001]   [0.0006]   [0.0005]   [0.0001]   [0.0001] 
Age 0.7635   -0.2195   0.5931   0.8904   -0.0130   0.3684 
  [0.5643]   [0.3744]   [0.4841]   [0.4599]   [0.5207]   [0.3403] 
ROA -0.3482   -0.2533   4.7645   2.4812   -0.2714   -0.3679 
  [0.1392]   [0.1376]   [2.6227]   [2.1547]   [0.2585]   [0.2380] 
Headcount (log) 0.0319   0.1404   -1.8451   -1.9070   -0.0498   -0.0516 
  [0.1627]   [0.1516]   [1.1731]   [0.9967]   [0.2135]   [0.1912] 
Clinical trials (log) 0.0275   0.0046   -0.0533   0.6658   -0.0095   -0.0135 
  [0.1648]   [0.1666]   [1.0018]   [1.2571]   [0.1587]   [0.1473] 
R&D expenditures (log) 0.1049   0.1241   1.3406   1.3026   0.2079   0.1878 
  [0.1280]   [0.1185]   [0.7107]   [0.6884]   [0.1981]   [0.1850] 
Technological scope 0.1360   0.3454   1.1173   1.5418   0.8143   0.3126 
  [0.3675]   [0.3095]   [3.1417]   [3.0745]   [0.6735]   [0.4648] 
Alliance portfolio size -0.0200   -0.0198   0.1343   0.1691   -0.0223   -0.0279 
  [0.0114]   [0.0117]   [0.0929]   [0.0913]   [0.0310]   [0.0301] 
Resources in portfolio 4.4332   4.5636   -10.1553   -15.5764   -3.5665   -3.3599 
  [1.1579]   [1.1298]   [6.4167]   [8.1197]   [2.8804]   [2.6794] 
Commercialization alliances -0.6892   -0.6706   -3.0722   -1.3396   -0.0741   -0.1420 
  [0.4713]   [0.4363]   [2.8078]   [2.2263]   [0.5064]   [0.4736] 
R&D alliances 0.6684   0.7559   0.3540   1.6378   -0.4880   -0.4051 
  [0.3875]   [0.3360]   [1.3888]   [1.6317]   [0.3210]   [0.2907] 
n (firm-years) 675   739   162   171   778   869 
n (firms) 103   105   20   20   118   124 
Log-likelihood -545.4   -592   -29.81   -29.22   -552.1   -635.7 
Standard errors in brackets. All models include time fixed effects.                 
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Table 6. Poisson QML conditional fixed-effects estimates: Hypotheses 5a–c 
Dependent variable: 
Novel partners - Existing 
resources 
  
Existing partners - New 
resources 
  
Novel partners - New 
resources 
Aspiration level: Historical   Social   Historical   Social   Historical   Social 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Performance - aspirations (<0) 0.0012   -0.0682   2.2040   0.5253   0.0111   0.0114 
  [0.0017]   [0.0520]   [2.8226]   [0.4219]   [0.2049]   [0.0333] 
Performance - aspirations (>0) -0.0058   -0.0047   0.0076   0.0138   0.0042   0.0057 
  [0.0031]   [0.0020]   [0.0175]   [0.0289]   [0.0032]   [0.0036] 
Absorbed slack -0.0032   -0.0015   0.0631   0.0539   0.0104   0.0085 
  [0.0030]   [0.0029]   [0.0272]   [0.0229]   [0.0052]   [0.0051] 
Performance - aspirations (<0)* -0.0086   0.0575       -0.4537         
     Firm-specific uncertainty [0.0033]   [0.0970]       [1.2323]         
Performance - aspirations (>0)* 0.0132   0.0050       0.0309         
     Firm-specific uncertainty [0.0166]   [0.0093]       [0.1144]         
Performance - aspirations*         0.0345             
     Firm-specific uncertainty         [0.0740]             
Absorbed slack*                 -0.0096   -0.0066 
     Firm-specific uncertainty                 [0.0129]   [0.0125] 
%Equity alliances -0.3187   -0.3801   -1.0586   -1.3944   0.1149   0.3031 
  [0.4094]   [0.3615]   [1.3379]   [1.4079]   [0.4394]   [0.3948] 
Firm-specific uncertainty 0.3431   0.8152   -7.6100   -8.2134   0.3188   0.1663 
  [0.3377]   [0.4012]   [4.1971]   [5.7694]   [0.3712]   [0.3931] 
Unabsorbed slack -0.0145   -0.0228   -0.2689   -0.2491   -0.0292   -0.0203 
  [0.0123]   [0.0115]   [0.1926]   [0.1279]   [0.0147]   [0.0132] 
Potential slack -0.0001   -0.0001   0.0004   0.0003   -0.0000   -0.0000 
  [0.0001]   [0.0001]   [0.0006]   [0.0006]   [0.0001]   [0.0001] 
Age 0.7816   -0.2113   0.5813   0.8692   -0.0127   0.3686 
  [0.5654]   [0.3809]   [0.4635]   [0.3985]   [0.5203]   [0.3397] 
ROA -0.3434   -0.2603   4.7231   2.7073   -0.2969   -0.3803 
  [0.1380]   [0.1380]   [2.5125]   [1.9616]   [0.2445]   [0.2278] 
Headcount (log) 0.0126   0.1230   -1.8391   -1.9156   -0.0479   -0.0512 
  [0.1662]   [0.1481]   [1.1735]   [0.9366]   [0.2095]   [0.1890] 
Clinical trials (log) 0.0140   0.0126   0.0059   0.4742   -0.0072   -0.0122 
  [0.1662]   [0.1661]   [1.0841]   [1.3184]   [0.1589]   [0.1475] 
R&D expenditures (log) 0.1129   0.1243   1.3395   1.3402   0.2078   0.1879 
  [0.1259]   [0.1159]   [0.7363]   [0.6444]   [0.1949]   [0.1827] 
Technological scope 0.1521   0.3837   1.1946   1.4285   0.8217   0.3142 
  [0.3641]   [0.3105]   [3.1058]   [2.9840]   [0.6682]   [0.4636] 
Alliance portfolio size -0.0188   -0.0198   0.1353   0.1628   -0.0224   -0.0280 
  [0.0120]   [0.0112]   [0.0940]   [0.0920]   [0.0310]   [0.0301] 
Resources in portfolio 4.4320   4.6341   -10.5448   -15.7471   -3.5887   -3.3751 
  [1.1702]   [1.1235]   [6.5961]   [7.8844]   [2.8834]   [2.6860] 
Commercialization alliances -0.6702   -0.6927   -3.0686   -1.0415   -0.0694   -0.1376 
  [0.4910]   [0.4409]   [2.8090]   [2.5058]   [0.5067]   [0.4740] 
R&D alliances 0.6767   0.7816   0.3247   1.5928   -0.4907   -0.4074 
  [0.3879]   [0.3339]   [1.3841]   [1.6664]   [0.3211]   [0.2911] 
n (firm-years) 675   739   162   171   778   869 
n (firms) 103   105   20   20   118   124 
Log-likelihood -546.7   -591.7   -29.77   -29.26   -551.9   -635.6 
Standard errors in brackets. All models include time fixed effects.                 
. 
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